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Abstract
Environmental economics has mostly focused on micro issues pertain-
ing to welfare and e¢ ciency analysis. I develop a general framework
to address short-run issues both for a closed economy and for an open
one where emission permits are globally traded. Fiscal policy and emis-
sion permit issuance can both be used as short-run stabilization tools
in a closed economy although the former is ine¤ective in a small open
economy. In a large open economy, issuing emission permits in excess
of international agreements remains an e¤ective instrument, although it
acts as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy, highlighting the crucial role of global
monitoring on macroeconomic grounds.
Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003; email:
arazmi@econs.umass.edu
1 Introduction and Background
Economics as a profession has, perhaps belatedly, starting taking seriously the
environmental aspects of economic actions. An inordinate proportion of that at-
tention has been focused on microeconomic analysis of e¢ ciency issues based on
representative agent optimization. As pointed out by Daly (1991), this lack of
environmental macroeconomicsis obvious when one looks at macroeconomic
textbooks.
Environmental issues inuence and are inuenced by aggregate economic
actions along many dimensions. In a world of the future where emission per-
mits are likely to be internationally traded in growing volumes, how do these
transactions a¤ect exchange rates, relative prices, and the balance of payments?
How do alternative short run stabilization policies a¤ect a country and the rest
of the world both in terms of output and emission costs?
Recent literature has begun to pay attention to some of these macroeconomic
issues. Heyes (2000) develops a modied closed economy IS-LM model which
incorporates an environmental constraint. This constraint takes the form of
a curve labeled EE, along which the rate of re-generation of the environment
exactly o¤sets its use, so that the stock of environment available is unchanging.
This stock is predetermined at any given point in time; producers substitute
between the use of the environment and capital in production. Raising the
interest rate on borrowing for physical capital, therefore, encourages substitu-
tion towards less capital-intensive but more environment intensive production
methods. Within this framework, Heyes explores the e¤ects of scal and mon-
etary policies. Considering expansionary scal policy, for example, the absence
of an automatic adjusting mechanism means that an increased level of output
and interest rate leaves the economy suspended at a point where the stock of
environment is continuously shrinking. This leads Heyes (2000) to conclude
that scal policy must be complemented by monetary policy to sustain a given
stock of environment.1
Sim (2006) has argued that an automatic adjustment mechanism does exist
that would ensure a stable stock of the environment in Heyess model. Consider
a scenario where the environmental stock is continually degrading. In such a
situation, Sim argues, public health is likely to deteriorate. This, in turn,
is likely to lead to declining productivity and a halt to output growth. The
economy, in other words, will hit a natural ceiling and create conditions for
redemptive action to restore the environment.
Decker and Wohar (2012) explore Heyess model but assuming complemen-
tarity rather than substitutability between physical capital and the environment.
This changes the relative roles of scal and monetary policy.
The papers cited above have made useful contributions to the literature on
1 In technical terms, the paper has a 3 equation system with only two unknowns: output
and the interest rate. The system becomes overdetermined sans a third unknown, say in the
form of monetary policy. In terms of logical structure, this is the IS-LM-EE counterpart to
the open economy IS-LM model where a xed exchange rate translates into a loss of monetary
sovereignty in the presence of international capital ows.
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environmental aspects of macroeconomic policies. The treatment of the issue
however, appears to be unsatisfactory in the sense that there is a tension inherent
in the overall framework used. Insofar as the model assumes underutilized
resources, predetermined stocks of capital and environment, and xed prices, the
frame of reference must be short run. The assumption of substitution between
factors in production and that of a steady state level of the environment, on the
other hand, imply long-run closures. A more plausible treatment may be to
assume complementarity in the short run but substitutability in the long run,
as rms develop alternatives to current production methods.2 Finally, these
papers assume a closed economy thus neglecting issues arising from international
trade in goods and assets.
This paper tries to develop some of these themes starting with a closed econ-
omy but then shifting to a more generalized open economy context. Through-
out, I assume xed commodity prices, underutilized resources, and predeter-
mined stocks of capital and tradable emission permits in line with the short-run
focus of the analysis. Emission permits have a dual nature, acting as inputs
to production for rms and as tradable assets for speculators. The presence of
money and bond markets gives the model an IS-LM avor, or rather an IS-MP
one with the di¤erence of course that emission permit trading is incorporated.
Asset demands depend on the rates of return, although trading in emission
permits introduces output as a determinant in a non-standard manner.
Section 2 considers an economy that is hermetically sealed from the rest of
the world. Thought experiments are carried out with scal policy and issuance
of emission permits employed as temporary stabilization instruments. The next
section shifts the focus to an open economy that is a price taker in the mar-
kets for emission permits and produces goods that are imperfect substitutes for
foreign goods. The e¤ect of permit issuance loses e¢ cacy as an instrument
for stabilization in this case. Finally, Section 4 extends the imperfect substi-
tutes model to consider a more general two country world with exible exchange
rates. Feedback e¤ects between the asset and goods markets lead to interesting
consequences. In particular, expansionary scal policy inates both countries
through repercussion e¤ects while an expansion of emission permits issued, by
contrast, turns out to be a beggar-thy neighbor policy. Thwarting the possi-
ble use of the latter by countries facing unemployed resources may, therefore,
require global supervision for macroeconomic reasons.
In a sense, this paper is an exercise in futuristic thinking. The world it con-
siders is one where emission permits are being widely used and traded across
countries.3 Throughout, the focus is on simplicity of treatment rather than
comprehensiveness, and I consistently eschew paraphernalia in favor of concise-
2The question of substitution versus complementarity between human-made and natural
resources has not yet been empirically resolved. Indeed studies nd mixed results (see, for
example, the survey of the empirical literature by Neumayer (2000)). The literature provides
some support to the argument made by Gri¢ n (1981), among others, that cross-sectional
studies are more likely than time series studies to nd substitution, since the former reect
long-run equilibrium results.
3See Ja¤e et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion of issues related to international emission
permit trading in the future.
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ness. The idea is to show possible ways to incorporate environmental concerns
in the analysis of aggregate (but simple) economies rather than carrying out
policy experiments in exhaustive detail.
2 A closed economy
Consider rst the simplest case; a self-contained economy that does not trade
goods or assets with the rest of the world. The usual properties of the short-
run demand-driven IS-LM (or IS-MP) model apply; goods prices are xed and
resources are underutilized. Built-in hysteresis, partly due to past investments
means that substitution between factors is unlikely to be signicant in the short
run and labor, capital, and environmental resources are complements in pro-
duction. The economy produces one good that is used for consumption and
investment. The asset side consists of three assets: money (M), bonds (B),
and emission permits (E). These assets are gross substitutes in asset portfolios.
The stocks of capital, bonds and emission permits are pre-determined variables.
In line with the IS-MP framework, we assume that the central bank sets
interest rates based on standard monetary policy reaction functions, and trades
money for bonds accordingly. A booming economy invites higher interest rates
while slack in factor markets leads to reduced interest rates. Thus, the money
supply is endogenous and responds passively to Central Bank actions. This
assumption is purely to simplify the analysis, and assuming an exogenous supply
of money will not qualitatively a¤ect the analysis.
The specication of the emissions market merits a closer look. Based on its
international agreements, the government announces issuance of a xed number
of emission permits over multiple sub-periods. Each permit allows for a xed
amount of carbon emissions. These permits are auctioned o¤ and traded in
permit markets. Agents may buy these permits for actual production (rms
requiring one permit per unit of production) or for speculative purposes, based
on an expected normalor long-run equilibrium price of the permits. Given
the short-run nature of the analysis, we assume that this expected price does
not change and any actual deviation from it is considered to be temporary
(i.e., regressive expectations). Permits can be banked by speculators for trade
between periods.4
These motives govern the demand for emission permits. For example, if
aggregate spending is expected to be low over a certain sub-period, rms buy
fewer emission permits for production, bringing down the price of these permits
4One could think here of the European Unions Emissions Trading Schemes (EU ETS),
which issue permits for multiple periods and allow for trading across time. Companies and
private individuals can trade through brokers much like in a stock market. Notice that we
allow for banking but not for borrowing of permits, i.e., purchasing permits that have not yet
been issued. Insofar as the aim of a cap-and-trade system is to gradually reduce emissions
over time, borrowing is unlikely to be a feature of such schemes. This probably explains why
existing EU ETS provisions strictly constrain borrowing within a very narrow window of time
while allowing for almost unlimited banking within a phase. See, for example, Chevallier
(2012).
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relative to the expected price over the period, raising expected returns from
holding permits, and triggering speculative buying in pursuit of the expected
capital gains. Thus, speculators play the key role of soaking up excess permits
in periods of low rm output and releasing banked permits in periods of high
output, and changes in expected returns ensure that the market for newly issued
permits clears in each subperiod. Moreover, risk aversion and lack of perfect
foresight means that agents need not necessarily drive up the price of permits
to their expected long-run level in each sub-period.
A concrete example may help describe the mechanisms at work. Suppose
the government promises to issue 1 million permits for each of the next 5 sub-
periods. Suppose also that the expected normal equilibrium auction price, given
production costs, is  dollars per permit. Finally, suppose that the market for
emission permits is initially in equilibrium, with speculators holding the permits
left over after rms satisfy their demand at the long-run equilibrium price. An
exogenous increase in aggregate demand greater than that expected by rms at
the beginning of the next sub-period then creates a scarcity of permits, driving
their price, , up in the market as speculators are willing to sell previously
banked permits to the producers at the higher price (and hence derive capital
gains). Conversely, a decline in aggregate demand and output drives down
the demand for permits required for production and creates an excess supply of
these permits. Speculators absorb the excess supply (i.e., bank the permits) at
lower prices (and hence for expected capital gains).
Notice that emission permits here have a dual nature. That rms require
these in order to produce goods makes them an input to production. Insofar as
these are traded in asset markets, can be traded across time, and yield returns
to speculators, these act as assets too. To put it in starker terms, emission
permits act as intermediate inputs for rms and as assets for speculators.
A feedback exists between the asset and goods markets both through returns
on bonds and emission permit prices. Higher bond yields (and real interest
rates) discourage investment and consumption spending. Higher permit prices
which correspond to lower expected returns  insofar as they impose a cost
on future production, too tend to reduce spending on capacity expansion.
Our discussion so far can be summarized with the help of the following
system of equations:
y = a(y; r; re) + g (1)
r = r(y) (2)
_
e = e(y; r; re) (3)
re =
exp

=
(   )

; 0 <  < 1 (4)
where y, a, and g stand for real output, expenditure, and government spend-
ing, respectively, r and re denote the expected returns on bonds and emission
4
permits, exp is the expected change in permit prices, while
_
e represents the
quantity of permits issued in a subperiod. Regarding the partial derivatives,
ay; are ; ry > 0 while ar < 0. As discussed earlier, the partial are reects the
positive e¤ect of a rise in expected capital gains from holding emission permits
(i.e., the positive e¤ect of a fall in the price of emission permits on spending via
investment in capacity).
Equations (1) and (2) are part of the standard IS-LM model (except for the
endogenous money assumption). Equation (3) captures the emissions market
clearing condition. With a xed amount of permits available over the period
of analysis, changes in output and relative asset returns help equilibrate the
market.5 Based on portfolio and production considerations, the partials are as
follows: ey, ere > 0, er < 0. An increase in domestic output raises demand
for permits, as do higher expected returns from holding these assets. A rise in
returns to the holdings of bonds, on the other hand, reduces the speculative de-
mand for holding emissions permits. Equation (4) simply captures the behavior
of expected returns on permits, which is driven by regressive expectations.
Substituting eqs. (2) and (4) into eqs. (1) and (3), and re-writing the latter
leaves us with a system of two equations in y and re.
IS : IS(y; ; g) = 0 (5)
EE : EE(y; ; e) = 0 (6)
where ISy = 1  ay   arry > 0 as long as the marginal propensity to spend out
of income does not exceed unity by too much,6 IS = are=
2 > 0, ISg =  1,
EE = ere
=2 > 0, and EEe = 1. The e¤ect of increased output on the
excess supply of emission permits is ambiguous. The direct e¤ect is to raise
rm demand for permits. The secondary e¤ect via the rise in the interest rate
is to lower speculative demand for permits. We assume that the direct e¤ect
dominates so that EEy =  (ey+erry) < 0; that is, an excess demand of permits
is created which puts upward pressure on .
The e¤ects of short-run policy shocks can now be easily described (see the
Appendix for the detailed mathematical solutions and Table 1 for a summarized
presentation of the results derived from this and later sections). An increase in
government spending creates excess demand for goods. Given excess capacity,
rms respond by increasing output. The excess demand spills over into the
5 In the presence of banking, the market clearing condition is, strictly speaking, not inde-
pendent of history, and should in mathematical terms be expressed as:
e+ e =
t 1Z
0
e(:)dt+ e(:)
where e represents permits issued in the past sub-periods and banked for future use. Given
that the (banked) supply of permits is pre-determined at time t, however, the expression above
is essentially similar to the condition expressed in equation (3).
6That is, ay < 1  arry . Note that arry < 0.
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market for emission permits as a result, putting upward pressure on the price
of these assets.
With a market for emission permits, the government can use the supply of
this asset as a stabilization tool.7 For example, increased issuance of emission
permits creates excess supply in the market for these assets, raising the expected
rate of return required that would induce speculators to hold them. Reduced
permit prices and higher returns, in turn, boost investment spending in future
capacity, and hence output.
Thus, both a scal expansion and increased permit issuance act to boost
output in the economy, although the impact on permit prices moves in opposite
directions. This latter conclusion generates interesting results in the more
involved open economy analysis that follows shortly.
3 A small open economy
Next, consider a small open economy that trades goods and emission permits
with the rest of the world, the latter at prices given by the world market.8
The country produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for foreign goods.
Goods prices are xed and normalized to unity. With a exible exchange rate,
relative prices can change between countries, inuencing competitiveness and
the trade balance. Moreover, exchange rate expectations now inuence the
equilibrium rate of return on internationally traded emission permits. I assume
these expectations to be static for simplicity. Thus, the small open economy
versions of equations (1)-(3) take the following form:
y = a(y; r; re) + t(y; x) + g (7)
r = r(y) (8)
_
e = e(y; r; re + x^
exp) (9)
where re , x, and t denote the (international) returns on permits, exchange
rate (the domestic currency price of foreign currency) and the trade balance,
respectively, while x^exp represents the expected depreciation of the exchange
rate. The foreign variables are distinguished by the superscript . Regarding
the partial derivatives, assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition is satised,
tx > 0; while ty < 0 in the standard manner. Speculative demand for permits
is a positive function of the internationally given returns on these in domestic
7As long as the tool is not used frequently enough to a¤ect expectations. In other words,
as long as it is reasonable to consider a change in e as a one time exogenous shock. The
e¢ cacy of repeated use is subject to the Lucas critique.
8Note that the economy is small in two senses: rst, in the standard Keynesian small
country manner, imports do not a¤ect foreign income, and second, the price of emission
permits is internationally given.
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currency terms. All quantities are expressed in terms of the price of the Home
good, which can be normalized to unity without loss of generality.
Now that we allow for cross-border trade in permits, another look at this
market is warranted. Notice that equation (9) implicitly assumes that only
domestic rms use domestically issued permits for production. Put di¤erently,
a producer can only utilize a permit within the country that issued it.9 This
restriction, although fairly innocuous here, signicantly simplies the analysis
in the next section where I relax the small open economy assumption. Note
also that, with the price of permits now internationally determined, permit
price equalization and permit return equalization are interchangeable conditions
in the presence of regressive expectations. We can, therefore, ignore explicit
modeling of permit price expectations along the lines of equation (4).
Once again, the system can be consolidated into two equations in two vari-
ables. Since returns on emission permits are now internationally given, these
two variables are y and x.
IS : IS(y; x; re ; g) = 0 (10)
EE : EE(y; re ; e; x^
exp) = 0 (11)
where ISy = 1  ay   arry   ty > 0, ISx =  tx < 0, ISre =  are < 0, EEre = ere < 0, and EEx^exp =  ex^exp < 0. The remaining partials are unchanged
from Section 2. The e¤ect of increased output in creating excess supply of goods
is bolstered in the open economy case by the resulting trade decit. Increased
competitiveness due to a depreciation (increase in x) switches demand toward
domestic goods. Increased expectations of currency depreciation or increased
international returns on permits raise the expected return on these in domestic
currency terms, boosting demand for them.
A scal expansion has no e¤ect on output, which now is pinned down in the
market for emission permits. The e¤ect of increased government spending falls
entirely on the exchange rate, which must appreciate in order to remove the
excess demand for domestic goods created by the scal expansion.
Can we say anything about the external balances? With an appreciated
exchange rate and an unchanged level of income, it is clear that the economy
is running a trade decit at the new equilibrium. The trade decit must be
nanced by a capital account surplus (foreign purchases of domestic emission
permits) at the internationally given rate of return.
Next, suppose that the government expands the amount of emission permits
issued per period, perhaps in violation of internationally agreed limits. This
creates an excess supply of permits, putting upward pressure on the returns
required to motivate speculators to hold these permits. Given re and static
expectations, output must rise to remove the excess supply through greater rm
demand for permits. Rising output is sustained by exchange rate depreciation,
9The demand for emission permits is not a function of foreign output. For example,
Japanese rms cannot use Swedish permits to produce in Japan.
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which switches domestic and international demand toward domestic goods. As
to the e¤ects on the external accounts, the higher output level and the depre-
ciated exchange rate at the new equilibrium have opposite e¤ects on the trade
balance. Analyzing the income-expenditure balance helps resolve the ambigu-
ity. Higher income causes a positive but lesser increase in expenditure, given
our earlier assumption regarding the marginal propensity to spend. The higher
new equilibrium interest rate magnies this gap. Clearly a trade surplus emerges
at the new equilibrium. The trade surplus must be nanced by a capital account
decit (domestic purchase of foreign emission permits).
Finally, consider the e¤ect of increased expectations of currency depreciation
(a rise in x^exp). The immediate impact is to raise the returns on holding
emission permits in domestic currency terms, generating an excess demand in
this market. Equilibrium is now consistent with a lower level of output, which
lowers the demand for permits, and is, in turn, sustained by an exchange rate
appreciation that shifts demand away from domestic goods.
Thus, in stark contrast to the closed economy case, a scal expansion has
no e¤ect on output in a small open economy in the presence of internationally
traded emission permits and a exible exchange rate. Expanded issuance of
emission permits is more e¤ective, although, as we discover in the next section,
it comes at the cost of the rest of the world once we relax the small economy
assumption. We have already caught a glimpse of the underlying reason; permit
expansion creates a trade surplus in the Home country. This has interesting
implications which become clear in the more involved model of the next section.
4 An open economy two country model
Finally, lets turn to the most general case. Consider a two-country world with
exible exchange rates. With two large countries, the trade balance in each
country is a function of output in both countries, necessitating explicit consid-
eration of both goods markets. Again, the asset side consists of three assets:
money, bonds, and emission permits which are gross substitutes in asset portfo-
lios and bonds are assumed not to be traded across international borders. The
stocks of bonds and emission permits continue to be pre-determined variables.
The following set of equations captures the system. Again, with regres-
sive expectations, the condition specifying equalization of returns on permits is
interchangeable with that of permit price equalization, obviating the need to
explicitly model re in terms of permit price movements.
y = a(y; r; re) + t(y; y
; x) + g (12)
y = a(y; r; re)  xt(y; y; x) (13)
r = r(y) (14)
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r = r(y) (15)
_
e = e(y; r; re) (16)
_
e

= e(y; r; re) (17)
re = r

e + x^
exp (18)
where ay ; a

re
,ty ; ry ; e

y ; e

re
> 0; while ar ; e

r < 0, the remaining partials
having already been dened. Equations (16) and (17) capture the Home and
Foreign emissions market clearing conditions. With a xed amount of permits
available over the period of analysis, changes in output and relative asset returns
help equilibrate the market. Equation (18) is the balance of payments equation.
It reects the equalization of expected return on permits in the presence of
international arbitrage and perfect permit mobility across borders. I continue
to assume static exchange rate expectations.
Equations (16) and (17) can be re-written in a slightly modied form:
re = re(y; r;
_
e; e); rey ,ree < 0, rer ,re_e > 0 (16a)
re = r

e(y
; r;
_
e

; e); rey ,r

ee < 0, r

er ,r

e_
e
> 0 (17a)
The returns to holding emission permits depend on their supply, the demand
for these permits for real output, and returns on alternative assets.
Next, substituting equations (14), (15), (16a), and (17a) into equations (12)
and (13) and manipulating allows us to write down the globalIS equation:
IS(y; y;
_
e;
_
e

; g) = x(y; y;
_
e; g)  x(y; y; _e) = 0 (19)
Satisfaction of equation (19) ensures that the markets for goods and services
as well as the asset markets are simultaneously in equilibrium in both countries.
Assuming initially balanced trade,10 the partials are as follows:ISy, ISy > 0,
while IS_e , IS_e , ISg < 0.
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The two goods markets are connected through international trade, which
plays a crucial role. A real depreciation (i.e., an increase in x) creates excess
demand for Home goods and excess supply of Foreign goods. Real income
rises domestically and falls abroad as a result.12 A rise in government spending
creates excess demand for goods in Home. Domestic output rises as a result.
The rise in domestic output at a given exchange rate spills over into the foreign
10So that income e¤ects are ruled out.
11The Appendix provides more detailed expressions for these partials.
12Again given the standard assumption in Keynesian models that increased output creates
excess savings.
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market, creating excess demand there. The exchange rate must, therefore, ap-
preciate to maintain global goods market equilibrium. The appreciation causes
foreign equilibrium output to fall.
By lowering the price of permits, an increase in the supply of emission per-
mits in Home boosts demand for domestic goods, and has e¤ects on outputs
similar to those of a rise in g. Increased issuance of permits in the rest of the
world, on the other hand, creates excess demand for the foreign good, raising
foreign output. Again, an appreciation is required to neutralize the spillover
into the domestic goods market.
Turning to the balance of payments, plugging equations (16a) and (17a) into
equation (18) yields:
BP (y; y;
_
e;
_
e

) = re(y; r;
_
e)  re(y; r;
_
e

)  x^exp = 0 (20)
where BPy, BP_e < 0 while BPy , BP_e > 0. An increase in domestic output or
the volume of emission permits issued abroad moves the di¤erential in returns
on permits in favor of the Foreign country.13 Investors shift their portfolios
towards foreign assets, putting downward pressure on the domestic balance of
payments. The reverse is true if foreign output rises or Home policy makers issue
more permits (so that they have to o¤er higher returns on domestic permits).
Our framework is now complete. The system consists of equations, (19)
and (20), in two variables, domestic and foreign income. Given the more
involved nature of the analysis, we will supplement the discussion with graphical
illustration to help keep track of things. Figure 1 captures the model in y  y
space. The IS curve represents points along which the goods and asset markets
are in equilibrium in both countries. More specically, it gives us information
on how Home and Foreign income must change in response to a change in
the exchange rate. For reasons already discussed, it is downward sloping.
The magnitude of the slope depends, among other things, on the sensitivity of
the central bank to the state of the economy, the relevant income and price
elasticities of trade ows, and the degree of substitutability between assets.
Since the two countries are linked through trade in goods, keeping track of
the exchange rate helps understand the impact of various shocks. As we move
along the IS curve in a north-west direction, the exchange rate appreciates. The
resulting trade decit is supported by a decline in domestic output along with
a rise in foreign output.
The BP curve is upward sloping. A rise in domestic output leads to a
di¤erential between returns on permits in favor of the other country. Capital
ows out and Home develops a balance of payments decit. Foreign output
must rise to lower re and remove the decit. Note that re and r

e both decline
as we move along BP in the north-east direction.
13As before, the e¤ect of an increase in output is somewhat ambiguous. We continue to
assume that the direct e¤ect dominates, both here and in the case of a rise in Foreign income.
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Figure 1: The basic framework. EDG(ESG) denotes excess demand (supply)
for (of) goods while BPD (BPS) denotes balance of payments decit (surplus)
4.1 An increase in government spending
Our rst policy experiment again involves higher government spending on goods.
Increased demand for goods raises output and demand for emission permits,
putting downward pressure on the expected returns. The IS curve shifts to the
right as equilibrium in the global goods and assets markets is now compatible
with a higher level of domestic output. Thats the rst order e¤ect as shown in
the movement from point A to point B in Figure 2. At B, the expected yield
on domestic permits is lower. Beyond this point, the exchange rate appreciates
accompanied by a shift in global spending from domestic to foreign goods. The
new equilibrium at C reects equalization of returns on emission permits across
markets and a rise in both Home and Foreign income. Expansionary scal
policy in one country helps the world as a whole.
To understand what happens to the trade balance at the new equilibrium, it
is easier to consider the foreign country. At the new equilibrium, foreign output
and interest rate are higher, while the return on foreign emission permits is
lower. All of these imply that foreign output has risen relative to expenditure.
It follows that Foreign (Home) must have a trade surplus (decit), as in the
case of the small open economy. The trade decit in Home is accompanied by
a capital account surplus and appreciation of the Home currency. Indeed it is
this appreciation that gives a boost to the rest of the world.
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Figure 2: Expansionary scal policy
4.2 Increased issuance of emission permits
Next, suppose that Home policy makers attempt to skirt international restric-
tions and issue more emission permits than agreed upon. What are the e¤ects
of an increase in
_
e?
The direct e¤ect of such a policy action is to create an excess supply of
permits, putting upward pressure on the returns required in order to convince
speculators to hold the excess permits. International capital ows in, creating a
balance of payments surplus. The international permit return parity condition
can now only be satised if domestic output rises while foreign output falls.
Increased investment spending in Home caused by the lower price of emission
permits makes the former possible. The depreciation that accompanies higher
domestic output acts as a negative shock for the rest of the world and makes
the latter possible.
Graphically, both curves shift to the right. At a given level of foreign
income, both goods and asset market equilibrium as well as the balance of
payments equilibrium require a higher level of domestic income. As shown in
the mathematical appendix, however, the IS curve, shifts more than the BP
curve.
Turning to the trade balance, y and rare lower at the new equilibrium,
implying that Home has a trade surplus, i.e., income falls relative to expenditure
in Foreign. The Home trade surplus is what transmits as a negative shock to
the other country, bringing down its output. We saw the trade surplus develop
in the small open economy of the previous section. The present more general
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Figure 3: Excessive issuance of emission permits
framework helps us see the output e¤ects on the rest of the world.
In sum, unlike scal expansion, emission permit expansion is a beggar-thy-
neighbor policy. The trade balance makes the di¤erence as in one case it acts
as a positive shock and in the other as a negative shock for the rest of the world.
Home benets but only at the expense of the rest of the world. Notice that
Home policy makers need not explicitly contravene international agreements by
issuing more emission permits. The same consequences would follow if they were
to reduce domestic demand for emission permits, perhaps by taxing speculative
holdings or through other means.
4.3 Heightened Expectations of Currency Depreciation
Finally, consider the e¤ect of a change in expectations regarding the exchange
rate. Specically, suppose agents come to expect a depreciation. Such an ex-
pectation means that capital ows out as foreign assets become more attractive
in domestic currency terms. Only a higher return on domestic permits is now
consistent with balance of payments equilibrium. An appreciation that shifts
demand from domestic to foreign goods generates such a di¤erential by reduc-
ing domestic output. In graphical terms, the AA curve shifts left and up since
a lower level of y and a higher level of y are required to generate the excess
supply of domestic permits and excess demand for foreign permits needed to
sustain a higher re.
Since the new equilibrium involves moving up the IS curve, the exchange
rate has appreciated. There is a trade decit and a capital account surplus at
the new equilibrium. It is the former that gets transmitted to the rest of the
world as a positive real shock. It helps equilibrate the domestic and foreign
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Figure 4: An inxcrease in the expected depreciation of the exchange rate
goods markets in the aftermath of the expenditure switching that shifts demand
from Home to foreign goods. From an income-expenditure perspective, y and
r have declined, while re has risen. All three changes imply a decline in income
relative to expenditure, i.e., a trade decit in Home at the new equilibrium.
Table 1: Comparative statics: The second row displays the various shocks con-
sidered while the following rows capture the e¤ect on endogenous variables
Closed economy Small open economy Two country case
" g " e " x^exp " g " e " x^exp " g " e " x^exp
y + + 0 +   + +  
re   +   + +
x   +     +  
t   +     +  
y +   +
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5 Concluding remarks
Economic analysis of environmental issues has largely taken a microeconomic
approach with emphasis on e¢ ciency, welfare, and cost-benet issues. A few
recent papers have explored simple frameworks for macroeconomic analysis.
These models assume price stickiness and factor substitution. While the former
assumption makes sense in a short-run framework, the latter appears to be
unsatisfactory. Moreover these contributions do not address the role of emission
permits as tradable assets and ignore open economy issues.
This paper is an attempt to suggest general short-run approaches to ad-
dressing these issues. The general approach bears resemblance to the Mundell-
Fleming family of models. Rather than pursuing comprehensiveness, the aim
is to create simple structures in order to tease out insights and o¤er exible
frameworks for future adaptation. The rst part develops a closed economy
framework where emission permits are traded within the country. Goods prices
are rigid, factors are complements, and resources are underutilized. With these
properties, both scal expansion and increased issuance of emission permits are
e¤ective policy tools. Fiscal policy, however, loses e¤ectiveness once we open
up the economy to trade in goods and emission permits as long as the econ-
omy is not large enough to impact the rest of the world in these markets. It
does, however, create a trade decit and currency appreciation. The contrast
with permit expansion is dramatic, as the latter generates output changes and
a trade surplus.
The e¤ects of stabilization policies on the trade balance fully come into play
once we broaden our framework to incorporate a two country world. Fiscal
expansion now becomes e¤ective, not only for Home but also for the rest of the
world, thanks to the trade decit generated in the former. A win-win scenario
emerges.
Undermining international agreements by excess issuance of emission permits
achieves similar results for the Home economy but constitutes a beggar-thy-
neighbor policy. The intuition is simple. The shock is transmitted to the foreign
goods market through the trade surplus created in Home. Since, therefore, there
is an incentive to cheat, tight global monitoring is required in a world economy
with unemployed resources and internationally tradable environmental permits.
The work presented here is suggestive. Given the short-run nature of the
analysis, the volume of emissions rises and falls with output (through the use
of environmental permits). An analysis of longer-run issues would require in-
corporation of technological change and factor substitution. Moreover, as the
period of analysis expands, renewable resource scarcity becomes an important
determinant of permit pricing. Countries di¤er in their structures (i.e., in
terms of level of income, degree of industrialization, and resource intensity of
production). Production of a good in a highly industrialized economy may, for
example, create less pollution per unit than production of the same good in a
developing country. Future work will extend the ideas presented here to analyze
these important considerations.
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6 Mathematical Appendix
6.1 Closed Economy Model
dy
dg
=
ere

2
1
> 0
d
dg
=
ey + erry
1
> 0
where 1 =
 ISy ISreEEy EEre
 = [ere(1  ay   arry) + are(ey + erry)] 2 > 0.
dy
de
=
are

2
1
> 0
d
de
=  1  ay   arry
1
< 0
6.2 Small open economy Model
dy
dg
= 0
dx
dg
=
ey + erry
2
< 0
where 2 =
 ISy ISreEEy EEre
 =  tx(ey + erry) < 0.
dy
de
=   tx
2
> 0
dx
de
=  1  ay   arry   ty
2
> 0
dy
d(x^exp)
=
txex^exp
2
< 0
dx
d(x^exp)
=
(1  ay   arry   ty)ex^exp
2
< 0
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6.3 Two Country Model
With balanced trade in the neighborhood of the initial equilibrium, the slopes
of the two curves are given by:
@y
@y

IS
=   ISy
ISy
=   xy   x

y
xy   xy
=   1  ay   arerey   (ar + arerer )ry
1  ay   are rey   (ar + are rer )ry
< 0
@y
@y

BP
=   BPy
BPy
=
rey + rerry
rey + r

er r

y
> 0
A Fiscal Expansion
dy
dg
=   1
tx
rey + r

er r

y
3
> 0
dy
dg
=   1
tx
rey + rerry
3
> 0
where 3 =
 ISy ISyBPy BPy
 > 0.
Increased Issue of Emission Permits
dy
de
=
ree
tx
h
1  ay   are rey   (ar + are rer )ry
i
 

rey + r

er r

y

are
3
> 0
dy
de
=  ree
tx
1  ay   arry
3
< 0
Curve shifts
@y
@e

IS
=   ISe
ISy
=   ree
rey + rerry   1 ay arryare
> 0
@y
@e
BP =  BPeBPy =   reerey + rerry > 0
Thus, the IS curve shifts more than the BP curve in the horizontal direction.
Heightened Expectations of Exchange Rate Depreciation
dy
d(x^exp)
=  
1  ay   are rey   (ar + are rer )ry
3
< 0
dy
d(x^exp)
=
1  ay   arerey   (ar + arerer )ry
3
> 0
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